Before we begin, a note about the next few entries in this
series. I’ve been trying to read the next book on my list, the Icelandic Poetic Edda, but I’ve been having
serious difficulty because (a) the text is incomplete in many parts, (b) the
translations are either tone-deaf or written in what amounts to Middle English, and (c) my lack of knowledge of Norse mythology is holding
me back. So I’ve decided to skip it for now. However, my copy of Rumi, who
comes after the Edda, won’t arrive
for another week or two, so in the interim, I’ll be jumping to the next item: St. Thomas Aquinas. He will
be the topic of the next entry; there is no escape from theology.
Speaking of which, today we are talking about St. Anselm: scholastic,
archbishop of Canterbury, and author of the most famous proof of the existence
of God in the history of philosophy, the ontological proof. Throughout the
years, there have been many proofs of God’s existence, ranging in rigor from
Dostoevsky’s yearning for a better world to Godel’s logical gibberish. None however has matched the elegance and simplicity of Anselm’s, nor
elicited the same range of vehement criticism, criticism that continues to this
day.
Anselm’s first work was the Monologion, in which he set down for himself (monologion translates to “a speech to oneself”) his beliefs about
the nature of God. The document became a success among other clergymen, and he
was bid to write a more concise version. Anselm wrote the Proslogion (“a speech to others”) to fulfill this goal, and also
because he felt that the Monologion
fell short of capturing his message, that the existence of God was not
something to be debated, but a fact which, if expressed in the right way, could
be self-evident even to the fool of the Psalms (the fool who “says in his
heart, There is no God”). He believed he had hit upon such an explanation in
the ontological proof presented in the Proslogion,
but since its inception, it has had detractors, most notably from a fellow monk
named Gaunilo. He wrote to Anselm after reading the Proslogion and gave a counterargument to the proof. Anselm later
replied with a counter to the counterargument, though it is generally
recognized that his reply was not nearly as strong as Gaunilo’s.
We’re only going to discuss the Proslogion and its reactions; the Monologion, though not long by Aristotelian or Thomist standards,
is the most verbose thing I’ve ever tried to read. Take this characteristic
passage:
“Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought
can be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought
is not that than which a greater
cannot be thought; and this is a contradiction. So that than which a greater
cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to exist.”
Therefore, I took advantage of the Proslogion’s relative brevity and the fact that it covers similar
ground.
Understanding Faith
Before talking about the proof itself, let’s discuss
Anselm’s own view of theology. Clearly we’ve talked quite a bit about theology
lately, so it would be nice to get an idea of what a theologian thinks the aims
of theology should be. Thomas Williams in his introduction to my volume writes
that Anselm believes the aim of natural theology is not “knowledge in the sense
of information but knowledge in the
sense of acquaintance. Anselm
intended his arguments to provide us with a way of becoming acquainted with
God.”
Anselm saw his faith as a stepping-stone to understanding
God. In fact, a working title for the
Proslogion was “Faith Seeking Understanding.” Apart from sounding like a
weird personals ad, Anselm’s motto reflects a method of approach to religion:
“[He] begins by believing in God, but merely believing does not satisfy him. He
wants to understand what he believes.”
This should make us think of two things. First of all, it is
uncannily similar, yet diametrically opposed to al-Gazali’s cryptic statement,
“faith presupposes understanding.” Anselm believes one can’t have understanding
– that is, acquaintanceship with God – without faith; faith is a means to God.
Al-Gazali on the other hand believes that one must understand and have
acquaintanceship before one can have faith. Though I had some reservations
about al-Gazali’s formulation, I can’t say I like Anselm’s much better, because
the second thing we should notice is that Anselm’s motto seems to trivialize
the matter of faith. Anselm himself complicates matters further by saying, “For
I do not seek to understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand.” (Emphasis mine.) Can faith be true faith
if it is only a brick on the road to something else? He may be trying to say
that his belief is not shallow and static, that it has an aim and a purpose,
and that this is a model that we should strive to follow. Even so, something
about the line strikes me as odd. Shouldn’t belief satisfy?
The Ontological Proof
With some background of his motives, let us now consider the
proof. I’ll summarize the argument, since it’s spread out over the course of a
couple pages:
(1) God is, by definition, the greatest being that could
possibly exist.
(2) Existence in one’s understanding and existence in
reality are different.
(3) Existing in reality is greater than existing in
understanding.
(4) God exists in understanding.
(5) By (1) and (3), God must exist in reality.
That was easy.
We keep in mind that Anselm believed that the ontological
proof succeeds not only in convincing those who doubt the existence of God, but
also in utterly eliminating the possibility of such doubt. In the same way that
mathematical proofs admit no possible logical counterarguments, so too should
the ontological proof leave no gaps into which one may inject doubt.
Yet before we even think of how Gaunilo approaches the
proof, we can see that the proof is not as watertight as Anselm might think it
is. It is elegant and even charming, but in the way that falsehoods often
appear charming. Each statement by itself presents no serious qualms, but by
the end, we feel as if Anselm has pulled a fast one on us. Unlike a
mathematical proof, its truth does not become more apparent the longer one
considers it. Rather, it seems true only at first glance; and our faith in it
quickly deteriorates.
On Behalf of the Fool
Overall, the Proslogion
was well received, and its influence is still felt upon the details of
Christian theology; it is not, on the whole, controversial. Gaunilo, a French
monk from Marmoutiers, wrote Anselm praising him for his faith and his rhetoric
throughout the Proslogion, yet he
withholds praise from the most crucial section, the ontological proof.
He raises several weaknesses in Anselm’s argument, most of
which revolve around the nature of human belief. Unlike belief in a
mathematical concept, which is cold, concrete, and utterly logical, Gaunilo
sees belief in God as more complex; mere argument is not sufficient. For
example, when Anselm refers to God as the being “which is greater than
everything else that can be thought,” Gaunilo laments that he can “no more
think of it or have it in my understanding in terms of anything whose genus or
species I already know, than I can think of God himself.” That is, the very
first premise is too abstract to even begin considering. (One may argue that
Anselm does not intend for us to conceive of such a being, rather to agree that
this is the accepted definition of “God.”) Moreover, since “there is no way to
derive from this conclusion [that God exists in understanding; (4), above] that
this thing also exists in reality, there is simply no reason for me to concede
to him that this thing exists in reality until it is proved to me by some
unassailable argument.” The jump from the mind to matter is not one that
Gaunilo feels comfortable making.
His most devastating argument, however, is the Lost Island analogy. This one I will quote in full:
“For example, there are those who say that somewhere in the
ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty – or rather, impossibility
– of finding what does not exist, some call ‘the Lost Island.’ This island (so
the story goes) is more plentifully endowed than even the Isles of the Blessed
with an indescribable abundance of all sorts of riches and delights. And
because it has neither owner nor inhabitant, it is everywhere superior in its
abundant riches to all the other lands that human beings inhabit.
“Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is easily told
and involves no difficulty, and so I understand it. But if this person went on
to draw a conclusion, and say, ‘You cannot any longer doubt that this island,
more excellent than all others on earth, truly exists somewhere in reality. For
you do not doubt that this island exists in your understanding, and since it is
more excellent to exist not merely in the understanding, but also in reality,
this island must also exist in reality. For if it did not, any land that exists
in reality would be greater than it. And so this more excellent thing that you
have understood would not in fact be more excellent.’ – If, I say, he should
try to convince me by this argument that I should no longer doubt whether the
island truly exists, either I would think he was joking, or I would not know
whom I ought to think more foolish: myself, if I grant him his conclusion, or
him, if he thinks he has established the existence of that island with any
degree of certainty, without first showing that its excellence exists in my
understanding as a thing that truly and undoubtedly exists and not in any way like
something false or uncertain.”
We can summarize his argument by juxtaposing it with
Anselm’s:
(1) God/the Lost Island is, by definition, the greatest
being/island that could possibly exist.
(2) Existence in one’s understanding and existence in reality
are different.
(3) Existing in reality is greater than existing in
understanding.
(4) God/the Lost Island exists in understanding.
(5) By (1) and (3), God/the Lost Island must exist in
reality.
Gaunilo goes on to praise other parts of Anselm’s arguments
throughout the Proslogion, but the
damage has been done. His kind words about the rest of the treatise cannot make
up for the way he savaged the crux of Anselm’s work.
Aftermath
Anselm, for his part, drafts a response, which, to me, doesn’t
sound half bad. His refutation of the Lost Island analogy reads:
“But, you say, this is just the same as if someone were to
claim that it cannot be doubted that a certain island in the ocean, surpassing
all other lands in its fertility (which, from the difficulty – or rather,
impossibility – of finding what does not exist, is called “the Lost Island”),
truly exists in reality, because someone can easily understand it when it is
described to him in words. I say quite confidently that if anyone can find for me
something existing either in reality or only in thought to which he can apply
this inference in my argument, besides
that than which a greater cannot be thought [i.e., God (emphasis mine)], I
will find and give to him that Lost Island, never to be lost again. In fact,
however, it has already become quite clear that that than which a greater
cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist, since its existence is a
matter of such certain truth. For otherwise it would not exist at all.”
The Wikipedia article notes how weak this argument is and
how Anselm probably realized that he could not recover from Gaunilo’s
refutation. I disagree. I think Anselm is responding to Gaunilo by saying that
the only object that could satisfy
the criteria of his Lost Island is God. Though Gaunilo is talking about a
particular Island among other islands, he is arguing semantics, dancing around
the notion of God. This doesn’t mean I’m entirely convinced by Anselm’s proof –
Gaunilo’s other arguments, to me, are much more devastating – but I think
Anselm responded quite sufficiently to the Lost Island refutation.
What strikes me as interesting about the shortcomings of the
ontological proof is that in a way it undermines Anselm’s entire project. The
entire dialogue is rather empty and sad: Anselm first writes the Monologion, a speech to himself wherein
he sets down his beliefs and a method of proving them; then he writes the Proslogion so that others can understand
his beliefs as well; his fellow monk Gaunilo comes and offers his criticism, but
his criticism is far too great; and Anselm’s reply, though powerful in certain
respects, does not do enough to answer it.
And then… nothing. The conversation ends. We do not know
what Gaunilo makes of Anselm’s response, or if we do, then the editor at least
didn’t think it was significant enough to include in the volume. Though we
still read Anselm to this day, volumes of his work are rarely divorced from
Gaunilo’s reply; how many other philosophers or theologians bear the weight of
their critics in such a way? It serves as a reminder of Anselm’s earnestness
and maybe too his hubris, thinking that he could craft a logical proof of the
existence of God.
Stray Observations
- Anselm was a scholastic, sometimes called the founder of Scholasticism. Though the movement was important, we won’t talk too much about the scholastics, but we’ll return to them (briefly) when we read William of Ockham, of “Ockham’s Razor” fame.
- Anselm: “How wretched human beings are!... They have lost the happiness for which they were created and found an unhappiness for which they were not created.”
- Thomas Williams in his introduction notes that Anselm is not considered to be a great rhetorician, but he does play some good word games: “we feel the effect [effectum] of mercy, but you do not feel the emotion [affectum] of mercy.” And again: “For if you are impassible, you do not feel compassion, and if you do not feel compassion your heart is not sorrowful [miserum cor] out of compassion for sorrow; and that is what being merciful [misericors] is.”
- Speaking of God’s mercy: “[I]t is better to be good both to the good and to the wicked than to be good only to the good… For it is out of the fullness of goodness that you are kind to sinners, while the reason why you are lies hidden in the heights of goodness.”
- Does that random orange spot on the picture of the book I found bother the hell out of anyone else?
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