Epictetus, Discourses and Enchiridion

If Socrates is the father of Western philosophy, then, to quote HIMYM, Epictetus is the weird, survivalist uncle who lives in a cabin with a shotgun... of philosophy. A freed slave with a bum leg, Epictetus taught Stoic philosophy around the turn of the first century, AD. (That's right, bitches, we're out of BC.) His take on Stoicism is relatively orthodox, but his presentation is far from it, mercilessly berating his (mostly imagined) interlocutors. Like other Stoics, he places little value on "externals," objects and events that originate outside of one's own mind. Since we have no ability to control other people or the caprices of nature, there is no point in trying, and we should focus instead on what we do have control over: our judgments of those externals. Or as Hamlet says, "There is neither good or bad, but thinking makes it so." (That's a real quote this time.)


Negative Externalities

Indeed, Epictetus doesn't believe in words like "good" or "bad" when they are attributed to externals. To him, good is the right judgment of an external, and bad is the wrong judgment. If, as he says, someone tells you that three equals four, their assertion is not bad in and of itself; all that is bad is that they believe something that is untrue, and it would be bad for you to believe it, also. “The essence of good and evil consists in the condition of our character. And externals are the means by which our character finds its particular good and evil. It finds its good by not attaching value to the means. Correct judgements about externals make our character good, as perverse or distorted ones make it bad.”

From here, we come to the second important aspect of Epictetus' philosophy: virtue. The gist of Stoic philosophy is that one must live a virtuous life by behaving in accordance with nature. Though we are not supposed to place value on externals, this does not mean, as Ivan Karamazov says, that everything is permitted. We are still to seek the good, which is located in the "condition of our character." For example, if one with a poor grasp of Epictetus were to cheat on his wife, he might say that marriage does not matter because it is an external and his wife does not matter because she is a mortal. But believing cheating to be permitted is as bad as saying three equals four because it is just as unnatural: one would not, as Epictetus says, grab food off a dinner guest's plate just because the food is communal, nor would one throw another out of his seat at the theater just because seating is open. Moreover, to cheat on one's wife shows that externals have not be adequately devalued: while he asserts that she has no value, he also asserts that the woman he cheated with has more value than his integrity.

Socrates

Epictetus' writings (he actually never wrote anything, but his lectures and diatribes were transcribed by his student, Arrian) date from around the turn of the first century, AD, half a millennium after the death of Socrates. In that time, he has been transformed through Ovidian metamorphosis from the father of Western philosophy to a Grecian hero in his own right. Epictetus' style of lecturing could be called Socratic, as much of the Discourses feature him questioning people as to their beliefs about externals (though I don't remember Socrates calling people idiots).

Moreover, he refers to Socrates' acceptance of death as the ultimate triumph of Stoic philosophy. By accepting his fate as outside of his control, he did not allow himself to be troubled by externals; he was "ready to die," as Epictetus says all philosophers must be. He didn't give up his integrity during his trial by begging for his life, and he didn't go through the unnecessary process of escaping from prison only to go into hiding. (If he escape from prison and couldn't live his life the way he wanted, with his family and his school, what was the point of living?)

Socrates desire to "know himself" is also related to Stoicism: Epictetus features this nice exchange with a made-up person:

“‘But the tyrant will chain–'

What will he chain? Your leg. 

‘He will chop off –' 

What? Your head. What he will never chain or chop off is your integrity. That’s the reason behind the ancient advice to ‘know yourself.’"

Religion

One thing I was not able to find any information on was the possible influence of Christianity on Epictetus' philosophy (edit: I found a French article titled "Le Morale d' Épictète et le Christianism"that was published in a German journal. I have no plans to read it.) as many of his views are compatible with Christianity. For example, whereas the Bible would say that it is imperative to follow God's will, Epictetus clarifies and says that we should follow God's will because it is an external, something out of our control. Matthew 6:19 says not to keep treasures on earth where "moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal," and Epictetus agrees, saying that "we get angry [with thieves] because we place too high a premium on things that they can steal."

There's an idea in academia called Stigler's Law of Eponymy that says things are never named after the first person to discover them. Stigler's Law (which, ironically, is an example of Stigler's Law, having been first proposed by a sociologist named Robert K. Merton) can be attributed to ideas that are discovered by one person and popularized by another, or are discovered once and subsequently rediscovered.

What's been so rewarding about this reading list is seeing ideas being discovered and rediscovered independently throughout the years. To me, without any knowledge of the influence of Epictetus on early Christianity or vice versa, I would be happy to read this as two philosophical schools independently (re)discovering a universal truth.


Death

Somewhere, in one of the books I read, a philosopher said that the goal of philosophy is to remove the fear of death (cf. DeLillo's White Noise and this hilariously relevant study). Epictetus has probably had the most to say about this of any other philosopher so far, and his arguments are powerful and coherent. "I am not Father Time; I'm a human being, a part of a whole, like an hour in a day. Like the hour I must abide my time, and like the hour, pass."

Death to Epictetus is not only an unavoidable circumstance as it is to, say, Epicurus; it is the culmination of one's life, perhaps even the goal. "Isn't wheat grown for the express purpose of turning brown, and doesn't it turn brown in preparation for being harvested? It is not grown for its own sake... Come, that's actually a curse we put on other crop, that it not be brought to harvest." We are only "beset by anxiety" about death because we are ignorant as to our "true purpose." Life, then, is not about living, but about preparing to die, as the purpose of wheat is to turn brown and be harvested. We are not living "for our own sake," for the sake of having life; and eternal life, in turn, should be more a curse than a dream.

A couple more quotes:

“‘What did we get externals for then?’

To use. 

‘For how long?’ 

For as long as the one who gave them decides.” 

“Make room for other people, it’s their turn to be born, just as you were born, and once born they need a place to live, along with the other necessities of life. If the first people won’t step aside, what’s going to happen? Don’t be so greedy. Aren’t you ever satisfied? Are you determined to make the world more crowded still?”


Reservations

I suppose it is unreasonable to enjoy Epictetus' philosophy so much and then be troubled by these quotes:

“If it is china you like, for instance, say, ‘I am fond of a piece of china.’ [As in, say it condescendingly] When it breaks, then you won’t be as disconcerted. When giving your wife or child a kiss, repeat to yourself, ‘I am kissing a mortal.’ Then you won’t be so distraught if they are taken from you.”

“We can familiarize ourselves with the will of nature by calling to mind our common experiences. When a friend breaks a glass, we are quick to say, ‘Oh, bad luck.’ It’s only reasonable, then, that when a glass of your own breaks, you accept it in the same patient spirit. Moving on to graver things: when somebody’s wife or child dies, to a man we all routinely say, ‘Well, that’s part of life.’ But if one of our own family is involved, then right away it’s ‘Poor, poor me!’”

It follows naturally from the rest of what he's said. Externals are externals, and attaching value to them is wrong; one should go with the flow of nature. Perhaps my problem is that what he considers to be completely within our control is not always so easily restrained. To reference Cicero's On Moral Ends, when Simonides ("or some such person") offered to teach Themistocles the art of memory, he replied that he would rather learn the art of forgetting. That is, though Epictetus is right to say that our reason is the only thing we have control over, I don't believe that that implies we can control everything that crosses our mind. This is the point where Epictetus would call me a bitch and tell me to suck it up and control my impressions, but I stand by it.

Overall, I thoroughly enjoyed reading Epictetus. We'll return to Stoic philosophy in not too long with Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, and I will certainly come back to Epictetus myself in the future. As Robert Dobbin said in his introduction, people are constantly rediscovering Epictetus and his ideas, and for good reason.


Stray Observations

• “Be confident in everything outside the will, and cautious in everything under the will’s control.”
• On tragedy: “For what else are tragedies but the ordeals of people who have come to value externals, tricked out in tragic verse?” Again: “ ‘So in your view great tragedies are merely the result of this – somebody’s “impression?”’ Wherein did Achilles’ tragedy lie? The death of Patroclus? Not at all. It was that he gave in to anger, that he whined about losing a mere woman and lost sight of the fact that he was there not for romance but for war. Those are the genuine human tragedies, the city’s siege and capture – when right judgements are subverted; when thoughts are undermined.” Again: “Behold the birth of tragedy: when idiots come face to face with the vicissitudes of life.”
• “‘But I want my wishes realized, never mind the reason behind them.’ Now, that’s madness, that’s insanity.” 
• On action: “If we are afraid to throw the ball [in a sporting match], or nervous about catching it, then the fun is lost; and how can we preserve our composure when we are uncertain about what next to do? ‘Throw it,’ someone says, ‘Don’t throw it,’ another says, ‘Throw it already!’ says someone else. It turns into a shouting instead of a sporting match.” This is a reference not to action in general, but within the context of having an intimate understanding of Stoic philosophy and the proper actions with regard to externals.
• On the purposes and limitations of practical philosophy: “‘Hey, philosopher, what good did your views do you after all? Look, you’re being hauled off to prison and soon will be beheaded.’ Tell me, what Introduction to Philosophy could I have read that would have saved me from being dragged away if a stronger man grabs me by the cloak?” Erudition is no match for the power of externals. 
• Even though we're 500 years removed from Socrates, the idea of "the end" is still very much alive: “First, tell yourself what you want to be, then act your part accordingly… All our efforts must be directed towards an end, or we will act in vain.” To quote the Avett Brothers: "Decide what to be and go be it.” 
• On the application of philosophy: “This is the cause of everyone’s troubles, the inability to apply common preconceptions to particulars.” Talk about particulars should bring to mind Plato's Forms, and also James Joyce’s comment about Dublin: "In the particular lies the universal."
• On death: “Make room for other people, it’s their turn to be born, just as you were born, and once born they need a place to live, along with the other necessities of life. If the first people won’t step aside, what’s going to happen? Don’t be so greedy. Aren’t you ever satisfied? Are you determined to make the world more crowded still?” 
• “‘Everybody gives me their attention and respect.’ Right, and I pay attention to my blackboard, wiping it, and washing it; and for my oil flask I’ll even drive a nail in the wall. Does that make these things better than me? No – it just means that they are useful to me somehow.” Respect and admiration are not desirable and give no indication of true value or worth.
• A great line about the nature of paradoxes: “What is more paradoxical than cutting into a person’s eye to restore their vision?” 
• “The following are non-sequiturs: ‘I am richer, therefore superior to you’; or ‘I am a better speaker, therefore a better person, than you.’ These statements, on the other hand, are cogent: ‘I am richer than you, therefore my wealth is superior to yours’” In the words of Tyler Durden: You are not your bank account. 
• “The first and most important field of philosophy is the application of principles such as ‘Do not lie.’ Next come the proofs…the third field supports and articulates the proofs, by asking, for example, ‘How does this prove it?... We are preoccupied with the third field and give it all our attention, passing the first by altogether.” Focus on the thing, rather than the meaning of the thing.
• Epictetus: Portrait of a kid who had no friends. “Is it solely at your discretion that you are elevated to office, or invited to a party? No; so it cannot be a dishonour if you are not.”